How we became hedonists.
Why
should it be controversial to claim that in the past couple of
centuries materialism and other naturalistic
philosophies—including naturalistic versions of Darwinism—have
eroded Christian moral standards that dominated Western culture
for centuries? Is there not biblical sanction for the view that
atheism and agnosticism—indeed any denial of God's participation
in human affairs—leads to moral depravity? Paul asserts in
Romans 1 that those who reject the knowledge of God will become
ensnared in "vile passions," and because of their "debased mind"
will be "filled with all unrighteousness," including sexual
perversion. Wrong ideas about metaphysics do indeed have
consequences for morality (see also Ps. 14:1).
Yes,
but…when we compare the moral character of theists with
materialists and agnostics, we face an obvious conundrum. Many
theists' behavior is deplorable, as atheists and agnostics
regularly remind us, invoking the Crusades and Inquisition to
dismiss Christianity. Any churchgoer can add contemporary
examples (not to mention the outcome of a little
self-examination). On the other hand, some materialists seem
exemplary in their conduct, at least in their treatment of other
people. So in what sense, then, do naturalistic philosophies
undermine morality?
Many
leading materialist thinkers in the past two centuries have
acknowledged that their philosophy destroys the foundation for
Christian ethics, and quite a few have forthrightly attacked
Christian morality as outmoded. The philosopher Daniel Dennett,
for example, describes Darwinism as a universal acid, dissolving
all our traditional concepts, such as religion and morality (but
somehow Dennett's materialist metaphysics is impervious to the
"universal" acid). E. O. Wilson, the founder of sociobiology,
claims that morality and religion are entirely the product of
material processes in the brain. Therefore he dismisses any
fixed ethical precepts, including Christian morality.
Dennett and Wilson are far from alone in using naturalistic,
allegedly scientific, explanations to dismiss Christian
morality. Since leading proponents of naturalistic Darwinian
philosophy so brazenly admit the morally subversive character of
their world view, often even reveling in it, isn't it sufficient
simply to cite their own words against them?
Yes—and no, not if we hope to understand how their ideas gained
credibility, and how deeply they have penetrated our culture.
Hence the timeliness of Benjamin Wiker's provocative book,
Moral Darwinism: How We Became Hedonists (InterVarsity
Press). Wiker breaks new ground by exploring the historical
connections between metaphysics—particularly materialism—and
morality, raising questions of the utmost importance for
historians, philosophers, and theologians, as well as social
analysts.
Wiker
unflinchingly diagnoses the moral malaise of the modern world,
tracing its intellectual roots all the way from ancient Greece
to modern America via the Renaissance and Scientific
Revolution. Specifically, he claims to expose the underlying
intellectual currents undermining Christian morality in the past
several centuries, leading to the moral landslide of the 20th
century and producing the Sexual Revolution and mass abortion.
Moral Darwinism
is a misleading title, since Wiker sees Darwinism not as the
root cause but rather as the culmination of intellectual
developments producing modern hedonism. Darwinism does not even
make its appearance (except briefly in the introduction) until
the penultimate chapter. The primary theme, then, is not
Darwinism, but what Wiker calls Epicurean materialism.
Philosophers may not be satisfied by Wiker's use of the term
materialism, since he includes in his definition far more than
strict philosophical materialism, i.e., the view that nothing
exists except matter and energy. He states that "Epicurean
materialism allows the gods to exist, as long as they are unable
to interfere in human affairs." Thus, Epicurean materialism
includes pure materialism, but also encompasses positivism,
deism, and some forms of pantheism.
Wiker
opens the book with an illuminating discussion of Epicurus's
philosophy in ancient Greece. Epicurus constructed his
philosophy to eliminate the widespread human fears of divine
intervention and punishment in the afterlife, which, he
believed, caused unnecessary disturbance in people's psyches.
Though he did not deny the existence of deities, he claimed that
they did not interfere with human affairs in any way. Without
any influence from gods or an afterlife, morality could only
have reference to this life.
Epicurus reduced morality to the pleasure-pain principle, which
states that whatever maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain is
morally good. Epicurus and many of his ancient Greek followers
emphasized moderation (bordering on asceticism) rather than
indulgence, because they believed that the avoidance of pain was
more important than the pursuit of pleasure. Modern Epicureans
would invert this formula, jettisoning asceticism in pursuit of
carnal pleasure.
The
triumph of Christianity in the late Roman and early medieval
period effectively subdued Epicureanism until the Renaissance,
when Greek philosophy and culture revived somewhat. Especially
influential in spreading Epicureanism among Renaissance
humanists was the rediscovery of Lucretius's poem,
De rerum Natura.
According to Wiker, Lucretius anticipated—indeed heavily
influenced—a good deal of modern, secular thought, ranging from
social contract ideas in political theory to scientific ideas,
such as Darwinian natural selection. Quoting extensively from
Lucretius to prove his point, Wiker states, "Lucretius seems so
modern because we are so Lucretian." Indeed Wiker does
effectively illustrate close parallels between Lucertius's
Epicureanism and naturalistic philosophies (and science) in the
modern period.
These
parallels raise some important historical questions. Did
Epicureanism directly influence the rise of naturalistic
philosophy in modern times, as Wiker forcefully contends? If
so, how and when?
Though
he succeeds in showing that some Renaissance thinkers were
sympathetic with the rediscovered Epicurean philosophy, Wiker's
attempt to link Epicureanism with medieval nominalism,
Protestantism, and the Scientific Revolution are problematic.
Indeed, Wiker identifies the key turning point in the rise of
naturalistic philosophy earlier than most intellectual
historians. He argues that "a complete moral revolution and the
secularization of Western society followed directly upon the
seventeenth century scientific revolution." He blames Galileo,
Newton, and Locke for smuggling Epicurean materialism into the
Christian world. They allegedly did this by promoting a world
view that was essentially Epicurean, though retaining enough of
a Christian gloss to deflect criticism.
Why is
Wiker so critical of the Scientific Revolution? First, he
apparently holds Aristotle in high esteem and opposes the
anti-Aristotelian thrust of the leading figures in the
Scientific Revolution. Second, Galileo and other scientists
erred, according to Wiker, by identifying nature with
mathematics, which operates totally independently of divine
intervention. Thirdly, he blames Newton and others for
allegedly integrating Epicurean materialism into their natural
philosophy by accepting atomism and the universality of natural
law.
Wiker
admits that Newton continued to believe in divine intervention
in nature, but he dismisses Newton's theism as inconsistent with
his fundamentally Epicurean materialist view. He states,
"Furthermore, it was the (apparently) complete victory of
Newtonian atomism that allowed—nay, demanded—that Epicureanism
as an entire system, both theoretical and moral, be firmly
planted in modern soil." Wiker thereby challenges the dominant
view among Christian (and many secular) scholars that stresses
the Christian roots of the scientific revolution.
In
order to make his argument work, Wiker consistently understates
the supernaturalist elements in the world view of 17th-century
thinkers, especially in his analysis of Bacon and Locke. He
calls both of these thinkers materialists, despite the fact that
both consistently upheld the existence of God and his ability to
intervene in nature and history.
In the
case of Locke, Wiker tries to explain away his theism, claiming
that Locke was Machiavellian, "presenting a materialist argument
with a patronizing quasi-Christian veneer, thereby advancing the
materialism under cover of Christianity." Wiker later
misrepresents the position Locke stakes out in
The Reasonableness of Christianity
by calling him a deist. In reality, Locke's main point in that
book was that Jesus's miracles prove his divinity. Thus,
whatever other criticisms one wants to raise against Locke, he
certainly was not a materialist.
Since
Wiker believes that Epicurean materialism was already firmly
entrenched in European thought by the close of the 17th century,
he ignores virtually all the intellectual developments in the
18th and 19th centuries before the advent of Darwinism. This is
a big mistake, because it skips over the very period during
which naturalistic philosophies supplanted supernaturalism among
the intellectual elite in Europe. It also does not allow Wiker
to demonstrate his claim that Darwinism is simply the
culmination of Epicurean materialism.
Darwinism brought Epicurean materialism to full fruition,
according to Wiker, by reviving its moral vision, producing what
he calls moral Darwinism. So what is moral Darwinism? Wiker
presents two different answers and never really explains the
relationship between the two. First, he calls Darwin a
"thorough relativist" and describes the evolutionary process as
amoral. As a consequence, he believes moral Darwinism opened
the door to the Sexual Revolution and abortion. Second,
however, he argues that artificial selection of humans
(eugenics) is a "necessary deduction" from Darwinism. How can
both of these be true?
In
order to prove that Darwinism has had pernicious moral effects,
Wiker examines in the final chapter the ideas of Ernst Haeckel,
the leading German Darwinist, Margaret Sanger, a eugenics and
birth control advocate, and Alfred Kinsey, the pioneer
sexologist. Most Christians will recoil in horror at Haeckel's
support for infanticide, Sanger's promotion of compulsory
sterilization, and especially Kinsey's shocking sexual
immorality. Wiker could have made his case even stronger if he
had focused his attention on more important thinkers who
directly relate their naturalistic world view to ethics, such as
Sigmund Freud, Daniel Dennett, E. O. Wilson, or Peter Singer.
Moral Darwinism
is a significantly flawed but thought-provoking book. Its
greatest value may be to stimulate other scholars to take up and
test and develop with greater rigor Wiker's arguments. And it
reminds all of us that the roots of the most up-to-date Modern
Thinkers are very ancient indeed.
Richard Weikart is professor of
history at California State University, Stanislaus, and a
regular contributor to Books & Culture. |
